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IRRATIONAL MARKETS, IRRATIONAL INVESTORS: THE FOREIGN CARD
By: John A. Sondey, professor of economics, South Dakota State University
And Tony Jacobson, M.S. in economics, 2002, South Dakota State University

The full arrival of the information age, transported through the medium of the
internet, provides the individual investor with quicker access to more information than
ever before. Economic theory tells us that greater transparency in investment decisions
should make for more efficient financial markets; i.e. smaller deviations of security prices
from their "true" or intrinsic values. However, recent evidence based in US stock market
performance suggests that the vastly improved information flow may cause investors to
act in a less rational manner, leading to greater market volatility and less efficient
financial markets.

The argument that information technology (IT) provides the average investor with
greater transparency in decision-making is a compelling one. With greater transparency,
more information will be more available to more investors, leading to improved price
discovery among professional investors. In turn, non-professional investors will be able
to obtain a better price (Pagano and Roell, 1996). In concert, the internet, personal
computers, discount brokers, and tighter SEC regulations on equitable disclosure make
securities markets more transparent. IT provides free access to all public information and
offers investors a larger store of information than was historically provided via the print
media. Pagano and Roell (1996) also propose that expected trading costs to investors

decline as a market becomes more transparent, which further levels the playing field for
non-professional traders.

However, it is the nexus between more perfect information and investor
psychology which may provide at least a partial explanation for recent heightened
volatility in the US stock market (Evidence the reduction of the Nasdaq composite index
from 5200 in March 2000 to 1300 in July 2002 and the deflation of the DJIA from
10,500 in February 2002 to nearly 7500 in July 2002). The paper will examine the links
between more perfect information, investor psychology, and market volatility and, as a
bromide, suggest that foreign investment comprise a part of one's portfolio.

Stock Market Efficiency:
Fama (1970) regards an efficient market as one which all prices fully and quickly
reflect available information. A market will be efficient when perfect, costless
information is available to all investors. Therefore, individual investors act on
information much like firms in a perfectly competitive industry. A second condition of
efficiency is that investors and, consequently, prices react quickly to new information
such as earnings announcements, guidance, and other public information. Odean (1998)
specifies the final requirement for efficiency: there must be large number of rational,
profit-maximizing investors participating in the market. That is, irrational investors
cannot process fresh information into rational investment decisions.

Eugene Fama (1970) developed the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) to explain the
process of information generation, assimilation, and pricing in the stock market. The
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weak variant of EMH states that security prices fully and quickly reflect historical price
and selling volume information. Reilly and Norton (1995) note that this construct of
EMH assumes that new data is generated randomly and that today's price movement is
independent of yesterday's price change. According to the weak form, it follows that an
investor's decision based on past information should not help him realize any capital
gains today because of the independence between historical and immediate stock price
movement.

The middle (strength) variant of EMH states that security prices will quickly
adjust to the release of all public information; which includes all non-market generated
information including dividend changes, economic news, and valuation ratios such as the
price-to-earnings ratio. The middle variant includes all the criteria for the weak form; i.e.
historical price/volume data. Accordingly, all current public information in very quickly
built into stock price. Thus, the aspiring investor can only hope to profit from
unannounced (future) information.

The strong form of the EMH proposes that security prices fully and quickly
reflect all information, public and private (information held by corporate management but
not yet released to the public) information. The strong form implies that no single
individual or group (corporate insiders) has monopolistic access to information that
would allow for capital gains.

As EMH is one of the cornerstones of financial market theory, many researchers
have tested the hypothesis, in all its forms, to determine the extent to which EMH
describes market behavior. While each variation of EMH has its champions and critics,
3

the weight of the evidence points to the strong form of EMH as too "muscular" in that
there are many documented cases of insiders profiting from privately held information.
The middle form ofEMH also offers its share of anomalies, among them the January
effect and the Monday effect. The January effect notes that investors engage in tax loss
selling at the end of the calendar year and then in the first four trading days of January,
reinvest the monies. Jones, Lee, and Apenbrink (1991) found that fifty percent of excess
returns are generated in the first trading days of a new year. The Monday effect reveals
that trading volume is lower on Mondays than on other weekdays and that individual
investors trade more as a percent of total trades on Mondays, implying that institutional
investors are more likely to spend Mondays on the sidelines (Lakonishok and Maberly,
1991). In a truly efficient market, a/k/a, the EMH, there could be no abnormal returns
because all historical information is quickly built into stock prices. However, the January
effect, the Monday effect, and other anomalies occur year after year, to an extent that
they are predictable.

In sifting the historical evidence, the highest marks for veracity would be
awarded to the weak form of EMH, while the middle and strong variants are difficult to
accept given the large body of countervailing evidence. However, in light of the
advances in information technology and the pipeline of more and better information
direct to the individual investor, one might expect that the EMH is more valid today than
in previous decades. This has not necessarily been the case.
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Investment and the Internet:

The reach and sophistication of the internet have been a major contributor in the
increasing percent of US households invested, directly or indirectly in the stock market.
Prior to the Crash of 1929, it was estimated that approximately 5% - 10% of American
households were invested, through some means, in the stock market. Today,
approximately 50% of US households participate directly or indirectly, through mutual
funds or pension plans, in the stock market. In 1975, 31 percent of total household assets
were held in the form of stocks, bonds, and mutual funds. By 1998, this figure had risen
to 61 percent (Barber and Odean, 2001 ). Although the growth in brokerage accounts has
slowed since the market's peak in 2000, the number of on-line accounts continues to
grow. Cerulli Associates and Robertson Stephens (2000) reported that investors opened
12.5 million on-line accounts between 1995 and 2000. On-line accounts are projected to
exceed 40 million by 2003. In 1998, on-line trading accounted for 37% of total, noninstitutional trading. While discount brokers such as Schwab, Ameritrade, and E*Trade
pioneered on-line investing, which makes up the majority of their trading volume,
traditional brokers such as Merrill Lynch, Edward Jones, and Dean Witter have also
found it necessary to offer an on-line product. On-line investment encourages trading
through of lower commissions, 24 hour accessibility, ease of use, and because the
transition from researching a stock to purchasing it involves only a few key strokes.
Barber and Odean (2001) estimate that an individual with internet access has 3 billion
pieces of information freely available regarding the stock market and corporate financials.
Investors who pay to open an on-line account, or for information services such as Value
Line or Morningstar.com are able to access nearly 280 billion pieces of information.
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Investor Overconfidence, Irrationality, and the Internet Link:
As investors are fed more information, confidence in the accuracy of individual
forecasts is likely to grow faster than the accuracy of those forecasts. Abetted by the
internet, information overload is likely to occur - or, as it has been termed, an illusion of
knowledge (Keller and Staelin, 1987). People tend to weigh information they agree with
more heavily than information counter to their beliefs. They seek out others who share
and reinforce the same viewpoint. Investors are more likely to join chat rooms, seeking
out like-minded investors whose moral support makes them yet more confident in their
investing acumen. As a result, investors will engage in more active and more speculative
trading (Barber and Odean, 2001).

Illusion of control is another term used by psychologists to explain individual
behavior. It occurs when people (investors) behave as if their participation can influence
the outcome of random events. Overconfidence arises where investors think they can
improve performance through knowledge acquisition and active involvement, as they are
comfortable with their personal and perceptive decision-making process. The illusion
arises where investors confuse the control they have with the control they don't have; e.g.
investors can control which stocks they place in their portfolio, but not the returns earned
on those investments (Barber and Odean, 2001).

Daniel, Hirshliefer, and Subrahmanyan (1998) concur with Barber and Odean
while offering the attribution theory. This theory argues that investors "too strongly
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attribute events that confirm the validity of their actions to high ability and events that
disconfirm the action to external noise or sabotage." If a trader places trades based on
his/her own private signal, the trade is "confirmed" if the sign on the share price is the
same as the sign on the signal. Therefore a negative private signal triggers a sell which is
confirmed by a lower stock price. Confidence is bolstered when a purchase is
documented by a rising share price, but a disconfirmed trade (investor buys and price
falls afterwards) reduces confidence slightly, if at all.

David Dreman ( 1998) states that investor overconfidence can be traced to three
factors. First; people tend to be unrealistically optimistic regarding future events. Shiller
(2000) elaborates on this by offering "hindsight bias" - in that investors regard historical
data as information they would have expected, were they living in the past. This bias
encourages investors to view future outcomes as relatively predictable. Dreman's second
premise is that people (investors) tend to hold unrealistically positive self-evaluations,
which, in tum feeds his third premise, that investors hold a surreal expectation of their
own ability to influence a particular outcome. Odean (1998) notes that overconfidence is
a characteristic of people, not markets. Psychologists have discovered that people
systematically underweight some types of information and overweigh other information.
Psychological studies indicate that individuals tend to systematically underweight
abstract, statistical, and other, very relevant, information while overweighing more
"attractive" information that catches their eye. This may help to explain the voracious
public appetite for initial public offerings in the late 1990's. Overconfidence on the part
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of investors tends to generate trading volume and price volatility, as price is driven
further from its intrinsic value by buoyant bidders.

If market valuation of stocks is driven excessively above their intrinsic value,

"bubbles" form . A bubble is more precisely defined as "a market-determined asset price
at odds with any reasonable economic explanation (Garber, 1990)." Bubbles become
possible when markets occasionally spawn irrational, inefficient, and "exuberant" pricing
(Shiller, 2000). Speculative bubbles date back to "Tulip mania" in Holland of the 1600's.
In the twentieth century speculative bubbles arose: in the US in 1929, where the Dow
Jones Industrial Average would plummet from 320 to 40 by 1933; in Japan in the late
1980's, when the Nikkei 225 index approached 40,000; and in the US in 2000, when the
Nasdaq composite would peak at 5200 (vs. 1300 today). Investor overconfidence and
hubris helped inflate the aforementioned bubbles and, inevitably, both bubbles and
confidence vanished in the predictable denouement.

Hirshliefer (2001) uses the term illusion of truth in attempting to explain investor
psychology. Hirshliefer proposes that investors are "more inclined to accept the truth of
a statement that is easy to process." He finds that familiar signal combinations, such as
associating money with the color green, are easier to accept than unfamiliar ones.
Information about securities/industries that the investor is familiar with are perceived as
less risky. Investors can take this too far when they focus their securities purchases in
familiar territory rather than pursue potentially better returns "outside the perimeter."
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Hence, a case can be made that investor (false) overconfidence, fueled by
immediate access to an almost infinite supply of current information, can lead to
increased investment activity, overreaction to both good and bad news, and greater
market volatility. Bubbles form when "herd mentality" is optimistic and break when the
prevailing mood swings to pessimism. The result is more amplitude in the market roller
coaster. Even with the decline in the growth of new on-line accounts, a larger percent of
households are researching and purchasing their own security choices than ever before.

Contributing as much if not more to heightened volatility are institutional
investors. In theory, institutional investors, formally trained and case-hardened should
react to changing market conditions in a more objective, less visceral manner than
individual investors, adding ballast in times of market choppiness. However, as market
professionals are likely to share a common ground of training plus access to the latest
technology, they may tend to react is similar fashion to new market news. Hence,
improved (common) technology and similar training will amplify the response to news
and increase volatility. The ultimate extension of this synergy is program trading, where
the technology automatically triggers a trade in response to pre-established signals.

The Efficient Market Hypothesis proposes (among many things) that more
perfect information, held by investors and market-makers, should make for greater
transparency and smaller deviations of stock prices from intrinsic value. By assuming
that investors are rational, EMH implicitly discounts (to zero) the behavioral/
psychological aspects that cause investors to act irrationally and increase market
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distortions from true value. To deny the behavioral aspect of investor behavior is
analogous to insisting that economics is a physical science which marches in cadence
with a predetermined set of rules, rather than a social science.

The Case for Careful Global Diversification
If more perfect information plays an unwitting hand in encouraging irrational

market behavior, where should an investor of average risk tolerance turn to reduce
exposure to US stock market volatility? There are several paths to risk reduction;
including the domestic bond market, physical assets, including real estate, and foreign
securities markets. Simply put, investment grade domestic bonds do well in a downturn,
as bond prices rise in a declining interest rate environment, while investment grade
quality markedly reduces the likelihood of default. However, in a strong economic
environment, upward pressure on interest rates carries the potential for capital losses in
the bond market which may be only partially offset by higher coupons. Presently, US
stocks, based on PIE ratios, are 25% more expensive than comparable European equities,
notes Ajit Dayal, investment officer at Hansberger Global Investors. Moreover, Dayal
continues, emerging market stocks are 35% to 40% cheaper than US stocks. The relative
attractiveness of foreign equities is compounded by a dollar which, given a $400 billion
trade deficit, remains too strong (Braham, 2002).

Hence, a more feasible strategy for all seasons is portfolio diversification in
foreign securities markets. That said- foreign investment via ADR's or country funds is
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not a low maintenance strategy. Given the increasing globalization of financial markets,
one cannot simply assume that most foreign market returns are negatively correlated with
those in the US, automatically providing ballast in the instance of US recession.
Different foreign economies are likely to cycle in and out of strength much like the
sectoral rotation evidenced among US industries, and foreign economic choreography is
unlikely to be synchronized with that of the US.

In 1976, Eugene Fama conducted his now-famous experiment in portfolio

diversification; revealing that randomly adding stocks to a portfolio reduced risk; defined
as the standard deviation of portfolio return. Using current (1988-99) economic data, Sill
(2001) shows that once an investor has 15 randomly selected stocks in a portfolio, firm
specific (nonsystematic) risk is virtually eliminated, leaving only systematic, or market,
risk. One avenue toward lowering the remaining market (systematic) risk is to spread
one's investments into foreign markets. However, this is easier said than done. With
increasing global liberalization of financial markets and vastly improved investment
technology, there is indication of growing convergence of returns among global financial
markets, although its extent is a subject of debate.

In 1992, the correlation between the Standard and Poors 500 and the Morgan

Stanley Europe, Australia, and Far East index (EAFE) was +58%. By the first months of
2002, the correlation coefficient had increased to +91 % (Stein, 2002). Alternately, King,
Sentana, and Wadhwani (1994) propose that increases in the volatility of factors that tend
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to move markets in opposite directions may be associated with the decline in correlation
coefficients (between paired economies), but evidence no causal relationship.

One can hypothesize that while foreign securities markets, overall, are
increasingly correlated with US equity markets (approximately 45% - 50% of global
market capitalization) over the longer run, they do no move in lock-step with US
markets; e.g. while the US economy is in the early stages ofrecovery from the 2001
recession, South Korea is in a later state of recovery from its 1997 recession. Per the
Dow Jones Country Index of August 1, 2002, published in the Wall Street Journal, year
to date returns in the US and South Korea, respectively, were - 22.78% and+ 17.60%. In
the same timeframe, Indonesian markets returned +38.74%; Austrian markets +13.72%;
Thailand' s markets +22.89%; and South African markets+ 11.22%. Focusing on the
differences between comparative country returns over a longer period, the five year
(1996-2001) annualized change in indices (expressed in US dollars) reflects winners:
Finland (+15%), Mexico (+8%), France (+7%), Italy (+7%), New Zealand (+7%) and
Korea (+5%); and losers, China (-27%), Brazil (-12%), Turkey (-7%), Japan (-7%), and
South Africa (-6%) (Morgan Stanley Capital Index in Forbes, July 22, 2002, p. 126).

Among post-industrial nations, freer capital flow among economies would
suggest that investors hold a portfolio of internationally diversified securities and that
international risk-sharing would be significant. However, evidence indicates that
international risk-sharing is not as pervasive as theory would have it. French and Poterba
(1991) conclude that in 1989, only 4% of US investors' equity portfolios consisted of
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foreign stocks while 2% of Japanese equity portfolios were invested abroad. In their
1998 paper, Tesar and Werner employ the term "home equity bias" to describe the
hesitancy of investors to invest abroad. A simplified model of an "ideally" diversified
portfolio would have investors linking their portfolio holdings to global capital market
share. Therefore, as US financial markets have a 45%-50% of total global capitalization,
American investors should be investing a greater proportion of the portfolios abroad than
their present 10%, in order to reduce systematic risk.

The argument for a greater foreign presence in the average investors portfolio is a
potent one. This is not to state that 50% of US investor holdings should be in foreign
equities, but simply that the foreign component be expanded, as the US equity markets
remain the most liquid and dominant among global markets. A crude benchmarking of
the British and Japanese financial markets (second and third in market capitalization)
measures each as approximately one-fifth the size of the US.

As noted previously, the strongest argument for holding foreign stocks is reducing
systematic risk by expanding the system. Second, world currency fluctuations can
magnify or shrink the return on investment. In 1999, the returns to US investor in
German securities in DM shrink from +39.05% to +18.7% when the strengthening of the
dollar against the euro is considered (when the returns were repatriated). (Hirshey, 2001).
Alternately, in 2002, the weaker dollar is enhancing US investor returns in eurodenominated securities. Moreover, as the dollar weakens, foreign investors are
withdrawing from US securities markets, putting downward pressure on US equity
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pnces. A third rationale for increased foreign security holdings is that economic growth
abroad often outpaces growth in the US which reflects itself in foreign stock prices. For
example, from 1985 to 1999, foreign equity returns, as measured by the MSCI EAFE
index, outperformed US stocks in seven of the fifteen rolling 3 year intervals (Hirshey,
2001 , p.689).

American Depository Receipts:
For the attentive, informed investor, willing to actively monitor and adjust a
portfolio, American Depository Receipts (AD Rs) might be the best means of investing
abroad. ADRs (which imply listing on a US exchange and compliance with SEC
governance) represent the strongest and most liquid foreign corporations. Specifically,
an ADR represents a specific number of shares of the corporation on deposit at a bank in
headquarters country. The holder of an ADR receives all dividends and capital gains in
dollars; but the value of those gains will fluctuate with currency exchange rates. Per
Michael Chafkin, a Citibank Vice President, over the past decade ADRs as a percent of
all US investor foreign equities rose from 15% in 1990 to 40% presently. The Citibank
ADR Review, mid-year 2002 noted that an equal-weighted Bloomberg ADR index

showed an annual average return of 13% from 1997-2002, compared to 7% average
returns on major US indices. ADRs represent large, multinational corporation that are
internally hedged against risk by a physical presence in a number of economies. Of the
Forbes International 500 Companies, 309 trade as ADRs in the US, and a total of 1558

foreign-based companies trade as ADRs on US exchanges (Forbes, July 22,2002, p 126.).
Summarily, adding foreign stocks to a portfolio may both increase returns and reduce
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risk. A foreign stock presence can buoy an investor in a market plunge, while domestic
stocks will help returns during foreign market downturns, which tend to be more
precipitous than in US markets (Hirshey, 2001).

European Treasuries:
For an investor who is primarily risk-averse rather than return oriented, a less
disquieting entry could be made into foreign security markets through the purchase of
European government bonds. While US Treasuries are the safest in the world, their
present yield is anemic, with two year Treasury notes yielding (8/20/02) approximately
2.4%. Conversely, European governments have been more concerned with inflationary
fears and hence offering higher interest rates on their safest securities. Specifically,
German two year notes are currently yielding 3.9% and similar notes from the UK yield
4.7% or twice that of comparable US notes. Moreover, with European currencies and the
euro strengthening against the dollar, US investors can earn added return from the weaker
dollar, building the "risk-free" return in the relatively short run to upwards of 10%.
William Byers, a Bear Steams executive notes that a five-year German note, currently
yielding 4.4%, versus 3.8% for a comparable US Treasury, can provide an annualized
return of 13%, ifthe euro returned to its first-issued purchase price of$1.l 7 US (Lenzer,
2002). As many US brokerage houses require European bond purchases in blocks of
$50,000, purchases of international bond funds may be the best avenue to risk-averse
investment in Europe (Miller, p.205).
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Emerging Markets;
Sakar and Li (2002) conducted a recent study of the efficacy of foreign
diversification, in terms of improving portfolio risk and return. Over a timeframe of 1976
- 1999, they found that US investors who added G7 stocks to their portfolio increased
return by 0.6 percent per year, while investors who also add emerging nations to the same
portfolio (a GLA portfolio comprised of G7 stocks plus equities from Mexico, Brazil,
Argentina, and Chile,; and, from Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Thailand) see
returns increase by 4.61 % annually. When the salutary effects of short-selling are
removed, the positive differential return (for a GLA portfolio) is 2.28% annually. Sakar
and Li find that under restricted (no short selling) trading, the entire component of
incremental return comes from emerging nations - and virtually none from G7 equities.
Emerging country stock returns show low(+) correlations with other emerging nation
stocks and G7 equities as well.
Low market correlations with other nations act to reduce portfolio risk when
emerging nation stocks are included in the American investor's portfolio, risk falls by
9.7% without any benefits from short selling. (Sakar and Li, 2002)

Conclusion:
Home equity bias implies that investors, internationally, hold an excess of their
portfolios in domestic equities. By expanding investment into foreign equities, US
investors can reduce systematic risk by growing the system. While returns among global
markets may be converging, when long run returns are considered, economies are not
synchronized in the short run. Like sectors within the US economy, foreign economies
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rotate in and out of real growth. Hence, investors can enhance returns (mitigate losses)
by investing abroad. ADRs offer the US investor easy access to the world's largest
multinational firms, providing liquidity while concurrently reducing systematic risk.
However, the risk I return tradeoff markedly improves when emerging nations are added
to the portfolio stew. Even though market returns are much more volatile in developing
nations, their lower correlation make them a critical ingredient in diversification. The
trick then becomes determining which developing country stocks are "investable;" i.e.
sufficiently liquid to make them investor-friendly. Emerging country stocks which trade
as ADR's would satisfy this requirement.
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